In the U.S., a number of states have mandated personal finance classes in public school curricula to address perceived deficiencies in financial decision-making competency. Despite the growth of financial and economic education provided in public schools, little is known about the effect of these programs on the credit behaviors of young adults. Using a panel of credit report data, we examine young adults in three states where personal financial education mandates were implemented in 2007: Georgia, Idaho, and Texas. We compare the credit scores and delinquency rates of young adults in each of these states pre-and post-implementation of the education to those of students in a synthetic control state and then bordering states without financial education. We find that young people who are in school after the implementation of a financial education requirement have higher relative credit scores and lower relative delinquency rates than those in control states.
Introduction
A growing body of literature shows a correlation between an individual's level of financial knowledge and his financial behaviors. Lower levels of measured financial literacy are associated with lower rates of planning for retirement, lower rates of asset accumulation, lower participation in the stock market, higher rates of using alternative financial services and higher levels of debt (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014, 2007; Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto 2010; Lusardi and Tufano 2009; Meier and Sprenger 2010; van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessie 2012) . One group of particular concern is young adults, as they have been shown to have particularly low levels of financial literacy (Lusardi, Mitchell and Curto 2010) and to be prone to engage in high-cost credit, such as using payday loans, paying interest on credit card balances, and accruing late fees (FINRA Investor Education Foundation 2013) .
The complexity of personal financial decisions facing American consumers has prompted an increased emphasis amongst policymakers on promoting financial education at all stages of life. The 2008 financial crisis further galvanized public sentiment to improve financial literacy, as demonstrated by the launching of Presidential advisory boards, governor's councils, and state and federal commissions on financial literacy. The rationale for this emphasis on financial literacy is that better informed consumers might engage in more prudent financial behaviors and avoid behaviors that could trigger broader economic problems. However, the existing body of research on the effectiveness of financial literacy education has yielded limited evidence that it changes financial behaviors or outcomes (Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer 2014; Willis 2011) .
Even in the absence of empirical support, policymakers at the state level have expanded and strengthened personal finance and economic education requirements for K-12 students.
1 Economic education has been taught in K-12 public schools in the U.S. since the 1950s. In the last decade, more personal financial management topics have been added to economic education curricula, and personal financial management is being taught to students at more grade levels. Given the scarcity of educational time and resources, the expansion of financial education in the K-12 curriculum could come at the expense of other valuable education topics. Schools have a limited amount of instructional time available, and thus the opportunity costs of adding financial educational content may be high.
Prior studies of state financial education requirements are instructive, but also highlight the challenges of estimating causal effects of curricular changes (Bernheim, Garrett and Maki 2001; Brown et al. 2013; Cole, Paulson and Shastry 2013; Tennyson and Nguyen 2001) . Researchers often estimate the effect of state mandates by comparing states with 'financial education' to those with 'no financial education' despite significant heterogeneity in the course content, course requirements, and implementation across states. Some states offer intensive financial education programs that require multiple courses and performance testing. Other states may simply recommend that schools offer some form of instruction on personal finance, but have no graduation or testing requirements on these topics. By combining more rigorous mandates and weaker recommendations, the estimation of the 'average' state mandate effect on student outcomes could be biased towards finding no effect. Moreover, mandates for financial education might be enacted at the same time as broader school reforms, or shifts in economic conditions, exacerbating the aggregation problem across time and geography.
Another difficulty is that the timing and quality of implementation of the classroom financial education is often unclear. Political and bureaucratic challenges may result in a time lapse between the enactment of a personal financial education mandate and the first year a graduating class is subject to the requirement. This is in addition to the years it may take schools across the state to have a well-developed curriculum in place and teachers prepared to teach the material. Studies often use the passage of a mandate as the start date for exposure to financial education, rather than the date of implementation.
This again could result in understated estimates of the effectiveness of the education.
This paper focuses on analyzing the effects of financial education mandates in three specific states on the credit behavior of young adults. Georgia, Idaho, and Texas each implemented mandated personal finance course requirements in 2007. These states have well-documented and specific requirements, and there were no other curriculum changes in these states at this time. We also identify other states with no such personal finance mandates or comparable curricular shifts in the same time period. This provides an opportunity to estimate more precise effect of the financial education mandate that is specific to each state's particular education program, rather than an aggregate of across states with heterogeneous financial education approaches.
We use two methods to estimate the effects of these financial education mandates on credit outcomes. First, we use a synthetic control methods as in Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) and Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) to create a weighted set of comparison states using trends in state-level demographic characteristics measured prior to the imposition of financial mandates. This approach allows us to compare each 'treated' state (Georgia, Idaho, and Texas) to other states that never implemented any form of personal finance education (and also had no other relevant changes in mathematics or economics requirements). Second we use a border-state approach. This allows us to compare geographically homogeneous areas. In both methods we use a difference-in-difference framework to compare the change in financial outcomes for students likely exposed to financial education in high school before and after implementation to the change in outcomes for students in comparison states without mandated financial education. We measure credit behavior using individual-level credit bureau data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York/Equifax Consumer Credit Panel (CCP) dataset.
Our results suggest that in each of these three states, students exposed to financial education mandates had higher credit scores and lower delinquency rates through age 22 when compared to those in the control states relative to these differences before the mandate. The magnitude of these effects increases with each additional year after the mandate was initially implemented, suggesting these is important-and often unmeasured-heterogeneity in implementation. We find that a student exposed to the personal finance education three years following implementation had on average a 29 point higher credit score in Georgia, 7 point higher credit score in Idaho, and a 13 point higher credit score in Texas (or in effect sizes relative to standard deviations, these suggest a 0.33σ, 0.08σ, and 0.15σ effect, respectively). We further find reductions in the incidence of 90 plus day delinquency of 3.6 percentage points in Georgia, 1 percentage point in Idaho, and 3.3 percentage points in Texas for those exposed to the education three years post-implementation. If we alter the timing of 'implementation' to the year the mandate was passed rather than when it was actually implemented in the schools, the magnitude of the results falls closer to zero, and in some cases changes sign, which is consistent with the findings from Cole, Paulson and Shastry (2013) . This suggests that specifying the timing of the policy implementation is crucial to accurately estimating the effects of financial education on financial behaviors. All of these results are similar when using states that are geographically contiguous as the controls. Among the most prominent of these studies, Bernheim, Garrett and Maki (2001) use data from a unique cross-sectional household survey conducted by Merrill Lynch that gathered information on household balance sheets, the state in which respondents attended high school, and their self-reported exposure to financial education, as well as to standard economic and demographic characteristics. The authors combine these data with information drawn from a number of different sources on state financial education mandates implemented in the 1950s through the 1980s. They find that people exposed to state mandated financial education had higher reported rates of savings and higher net worth. Moreover, consistent with there being a delay between the passage of a state mandate and when it is fully implemented in the classroom, the authors find that the effect on savings and net worth increases as the number of years post-mandate that the student was exposed increases.
Another study of the effect of state personal finance mandates by Tennyson and Nguyen (2001) uses data from a 1997 survey of high school seniors across the U.S. conducted by the Jumps$tart Coalition that included a test of personal financial literacy. The authors examined how contemporaneous state personal financial education mandates affect student performance on the financial literacy test. They find that in models where a simple indicator is used for the presence of a mandate-averaging the types of mandatesthere is no effect of personal financial education on student test scores. However, when the type of mandate is disaggregated into specific types-having a standard only, having a course requirement, and requiring testing-they find that only mandates with a course requirement were positively and significantly related to financial literacy test scores.
More recent work by Cole, Paulson and Shastry (2013) uses data from a variety of sources, including the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the 2000 U.S. Census, and credit bureau records, to examine the average effect of state personal finance and math education requirements for people born between 1946 and 1965, and between 1964 and 1976 , respectively. Using a difference-in-difference identification strategy that aggregates the various types of education programs implemented across states, the authors find that only math education is associated with improved financial outcomes, such as a reduced probability of experiencing foreclosure, defaulting on a credit card, and declaring bankruptcy. Brown et al. (2013) pursue a similar strategy to Cole, Paulson and Shastry (2013) , by analyzing the effect of state personal finance, economic, and math education mandates on later life credit outcomes using a difference-in-difference identification strategy. However, they examine a more recent set of state mandates that were implemented between 1998
and 2012, and thus, a younger cohort. The authors find that both math education and personal finance education have a significant effect on credit outcomes in early adulthood, increasing credit scores, lowering credit delinquency, and lowering the overall amount of debt held by an individual. The magnitude of the effect of these mandates on credit outcomes increases with additional time post-passage. In contrast to the math and personal finance mandates, Brown et al. (2013) find that high school economic education appears to be associated with higher debt and greater delinquency later in life.
An important consideration in evaluating financial education programs is determining what measures ought to be used to judge the program's effectiveness, and whether changes in those measures resulting from the education actually relate to subsequent changes in financial behavior and outcomes (Miller et al. 2014) . Prior studies largely focus on knowledge gains, showing that students can and do learn specific information from the courses.
However, learning content on economics or finance is merely a proxy for the broader pol- 
Data
The primary source of data for this study is the We analyze the credit behavior of young adults starting at age 18 (or at the time of their first credit report if the file is too thin at age 18) until they reach age 22.
2 We first examine the Equifax Risk Scores (credit scores), and expect that the average credit score for the young people exposed to the mandated financial education would increase due to their having acquired additional knowledge about credit management and positive financial behaviors. However, the effect on one's credit score is likely to be small in magnitude, as they are mostly just being established during the age range we examine, and it is difficult to establish a substantially higher credit score than one's peers with only a brief credit history.
3 Next, we consider the possibility that exposure to financial education could help young individuals reduce negative credit outcomes. Specifically, we consider ever being 30 or 90 plus days delinquent on any credit account, and 30 or 90 plus days delinquent on an auto loan. As credit cards are the primary form of credit held by people ages 18 to 22, the results for the outcome credit card delinquency are nearly identical to those for any delinquency. Moreover, the CARD Act (Credit Accountability
Resp Act of 2009) went into effect during our sample period and, while national in scope, may have affected credit card related outcomes. 4 We therefore omit the results for credit cards from our analysis and discussion.
Treatment States
We select three states that changed financial education mandates after 2000, and that previously had not mandated financial education in high schools: Georgia, Idaho, and
Texas. Each of these states had well-documented interventions that are considered rela-tively rigorous by the Council for Economic Education Council for Economic Education (2014). The three states' mandates share some common features. First, they all have some form of standardized personal finance curriculum. Second, each state integrated the personal finance requirement into an economics requirement for high school students. Table 1 summarizes key parameters of each states' financial education policy, and we discuss each state's program in depth below.
Georgia
The Georgia Board of Education first approved a mandate for incorporating financial credit course in Economics was required to be taught, but was not required to cover personal finance topics.
6
According to the Georgia Council of Economic Education the goal of "Let's Make it Personal'' is that: "Students leaving school are prepared for their economic roles as workers, consumers, and citizens.'' The learning objectives of the course include, the 5 One common approach used in high school economics and finance classes is to conduct a competition to invest in a mock investment portfolio. These activities encourage students to engage in applied learning, and in the process appear to gain financial knowledge (Hinojosa et al. 2009 (Hinojosa et al. , 2007 Walstad and Buckles 2008) . However, studies showing the effects of this approach may be biased by the selection of schools to offer the course and students to enroll in the course (Harter and Harter 2010; Mandell and Klein 2007; Mandell and Schmid Klein 2009; McCormick 2009) . Notably, the state mandated a systematic implementation of a standardized set of content across schools, as well as student performance testing on personal finance content.
6 Even if a large portion of schools were teaching personal finance within the economics course prior to the introduction of the mandate, this would simply bias our estimates against finding an effect. student will: (1) apply rational decision making to personal spending and saving choices;
(2) explain that banks and other financial institutions are businesses that channel funds from savers to investors; (3) explain how changes in monetary and fiscal policy can affect an individual's spending and savings choices; (4) evaluate the costs and benefits of using credit; (5) describe how insurance and other risk-management strategies protect against financial loss; (6) describe how the earnings of workers are determined in the marketplace.
Idaho
In 2003, the Idaho State Board of Education mandated that schools should "include instruction stressing general financial literacy from basic budgeting to financial investments, including bankruptcy, etc'' (Section 53A-1-402). Beginning with the graduating class of 2007, all students in the state were required to take one semester of economics to graduate as part of a 3-credit social studies requirement. The curriculum for this course was developed by family and consumer economics faculty at Idaho State University. The intent of the course was for students to "learn their roles as producers, consumers, and citizens.'' The course is comprised of five segments of which 20 percent is devoted to traditional economics topics, and then 15 percent focuses solely on credit and debt, where students learn how and when to apply for loans and the value of their credit scores and credit reports. The next 20 percent of the course is on saving and investing decisions, followed by a unit on money management skills (another 20 percent of the course), including how to interpret paystubs, taxes, and make cost-benefit decisions when making a purchase. The remainder of the course is related to family finances, designing a resume and applying for jobs, as well as consumer roles, rights, and responsibilities, being an informed consumer, understanding fraud, identity theft, and how to set financial goals, and using tools such as Consumer Reports magazines to make informed decisions. Any school district may include additional material, but each school must teach the following topics at a minimum: 1) understanding interest and avoiding and eliminating credit card debt; 2) understanding the rights and responsibilities of renting or buying a home; 3) managing money to make the transition from renting a home to home ownership; 4) starting a small business; 5) being a prudent investor in the stock market and using other investment options; 6) beginning a savings program and planning for retirement; 7) bankruptcy; 8) the types of bank accounts available to consumers and the benefits of maintaining a bank account; 9) balancing a checkbook; 10) the types of loans available to consumers and becoming a low-risk borrower; 11) understanding insurance; and 12) charitable giving.
Texas

Control States
We select 25 potential control states, each of which did not have a personal finance education course requirement during the study period according to Jump$tart.org and the Council of Economic Education. These states, also displayed in the map in Figure   1 , 10 RI experienced a change in mathematics curriculum, MI experienced a change in Economics curriculum, and MD experienced several mandates in personal finance that were added and lifted during the sample period.
11 LA's mandate took place in conjunction with Hurricane Katrina; NH's mandated only affected 7th-8th graders, lagging its effect on young adults; IL passed a mandate but still allows county-by-county variation in implementation; SC passed a mandate but never required a class; NC passed their mandate in 2005, though there is no untreated border state for comparison; WV implemented a financial literacy component to a civics course, combining civics, economics and geography but little is known about the breakdown of these courses across the state; KS passed a mandate requiring standards implementation, though most of these are implemented in grades 4 and 8.
12 Specification 1 excludes DC since GDP data is not available or directly comparable to the other states.
graduated from college, percent with some college, Census region and division, percent of private schools, race and ethnic composition, expenditures per pupil, and total schooling expenditures. Specification 2 retains all of the variables from Specification 1, but drops GDP. Specification 3 only includes demographic and schooling variables: poverty rate, unemployment rate, education levels, Census region and division, percent of private schools, race and ethnic composition, expenditures per pupil, and total schooling expenditures. Specification 4 adds fourth and eighth grade math scores to Specification 3, which reduces the subsample of control states.
13 These data come from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) provided by the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES). We begin by examining the states that will form the counterfactual for our estimates.
As shown in Figure 1 , the three darkly shaded states are the treated areas, while the lightly shaded areas are potential controls. Figure 2 shows the border states used in the analysis in Panel A and matched synthetic controls in Panel B. While geography is one method to provide more homogeneous comparisons, matching states on observables can provide more robust comparisons. As shown in Table 2 , the states in this matched sample are weighted based on a specification of state-level demographic and education data. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the treatment and synthetic control samples.
It further provides control samples based on border states models, another approach commonly used in difference-in-difference studies, under the assumption that geographically proximate states are more homogeneous. The synthetic control sample closely matches the treated state, as does the border state sample. While the summary statistics for the border state samples appear to more closely approximate the treatment states than those for the synthetic control samples, the differences are generally not statistically significant.
Our empirical approach employs a difference-in-difference specification where we exploit variation: 1) across individuals within the same state before and after the implementation of the mandate and 2) across individuals in the treatment and control states within the same time period. Using the synthetic control samples discussed above, we estimate Equation (1) separately for each pair of treatment and control states. We choose to retain the panel structure of the CCP data in order to control for the contemporaneous probability of default in any given period with quarter by year fixed effects. This way, we control for any shifts in the national economy that change the probability of default in a given period.
The outcomes of interest, labeled Y ist in Equation (1) are the individual's credit score, delinquency on any credit account, and delinquency on an auto loan in a given quarter t from age 18 until just turning age 22. To account for unobserved time trends and local area factors, all estimates include state-level and quarter-by-year fixed effects.
In Equation (1) Thus, P3 it equals one if the individual graduated high school (turned 18) in the third year the financial education requirement was enacted. For example, a student in Idaho that graduated high school in 2009, three years after the course requirement was added to the curriculum, will be used to estimate the β 3 coefficient. As we include state fixed effects and quarter-by-year fixed effects, the post-implementation period indicator variable P is omitted due to collinearity. We follow each individual in the pre-and post-periods for at most four years (and fewer if individuals take longer to establish a credit file). This way, we are not simply comparing younger borrowers to older borrowers in our estimation, where younger borrowers simply have less time to establish a credit history or become delinquent.
We measure the unemployment rate in each county in the year of graduation as u it to control for labor market conditions across cohorts. δ s are state fixed effects that account for any time invariant state specific characteristics that may affect credit scores or delinquency rates, and X it is the number of credit accounts an individual has in a given period. Finally, η t incorporates quarter-by-year fixed effects to account for quarter and year specific factors that may affect credit outcomes, such as economic conditions. When we estimate Equation (1), we use the weights from Table 2 Column (1) to weight the least squares regression, with the treated state weighted by one. All standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
Our analysis requires three identifying assumptions. First, we assume that individuals begin their credit file in the same state they attended high school, which is consistent with Brown et al. (2013) where they document that over 90 percent of individuals stay in the same state from age 18 through age 22. Second, we assume that everyone in our sample was actually exposed to the financial education while in high school; however, if some of those students that we classify as treated did not in-fact receive the financial education, this would only serve to bias our estimates towards zero. Third, we assume that individuals in the states with financial education course requirements would have had similar trends in financial outcomes to those in the control states in the absence of the policy. Initial regression results are shown for each state in Table 4 across the five credit outcomes of interest: credit score; ever being 30 or 90 days delinquent on any account; and ever being 30 or 90 days delinquent on an auto loan. Estimates for Georgia are shown in Panel A of Table 4 . In the first column, we see that those young adults exposed to the financial education mandate for only one year directly following implementationPost1 -show only marginally higher credit scores than those young adults in the synthetic control state. However, the magnitude of the effect of financial education on credit score increases substantially with successive years of exposure following the implementation of the mandate. The estimate on the Post2 coefficient indicates that those young adults exposed to Georgia's mandate for two years have credit scores 13.4 points higher than those young adults in the synthetic control state. The effect is even greater for those young adults exposed to Georgia's mandate three years following implementation, with the coefficient on Post3 indicating that their credit scores are on average 28.7 points higher than those of young adults in the synthetic control state. Both the two and three years post implementation estimates are significant at the 1% level. Given that the curriculum in Georgia was rather intensive and involved the need for teachers to adapt to a complex curriculum, the increasing magnitude likely reflects the teachers' ongoing learning and tailoring of the content and approach so as to be more effective for their students.
Results
In the second column of results in Table 4 Panel A for Georgia, we examine the effect of exposure to financial education on the probability of having any account 30 days delinquent. In the first year post implementation, we see a modest, though statistically significant, 0.2 percentage point decline in the incidence of 30 day delinquency among young adults exposed to Georgia's financial education. Again, the magnitude of the effect increases substantially with additional years since the implementation of the mandate, with those exposed two years after implementation having a 0.5 percentage point lower rate of 30 day delinquency, and those exposed three years after implementation having a 1.5 percentage point lower rate of delinquency. To put this 1.5 percentage point decline in context, from Table 5 the average rate of 30 day delinquency for the Georgia estimation sample is 15.6 percent, implying that those who were exposed to the financial education three years post-implementation were approximately 10 percent less likely to be 30 days delinquent over the sample period. This lower rate of delinquency among young adults who received financial education is consistent with their also having a higher credit score, as making payments on-time has a substantial effect on the credit score of someone with a brief credit history.
When examining the effect of Georgia's financial education on the more severe outcome being 90 plus days delinquent on any account, we continue to observe that the magnitude of the reduction in delinquency increases with additional years post-implementation. As shown in the third column of Table 4 , the financial education appears to have a particularly pronounced effect on the rate of 90 plus day delinquency, with reductions of 0.5 percentage points, 2.0 percentage points, and 3.6 percentage points in years one, two, and three postimplementation, respectively. All results are significant at the 1% level. With a base rate of 17.8 percent 90 plus days delinquent in the estimation sample, the three year estimate of 3.6 percentage points implies a 20.2 percent lower probability of severe delinquency.
In addition to delinquency on any credit account, we focus on delinquency on auto loans, which are relatively common among young adults. In Column 4 of Table 4 we find that Georgia young adults exposed to financial education for one year have a 0.2 percentage point lower rate of 30 day auto delinquency than those in the synthetic control state, though this is not statistically different from zero. After two years of exposure to the education, the effect on 30 day auto loan delinquency nearly doubles in magnitude to a 0.5 percentage point decline and becomes statistically significant at the 5% level. Three years post-implementation, the decline in 30 day auto loan delinquency further increases in magnitude to 1.7 percentage points. With an average rate of 30 day delinquency on auto loans in the sample of 3.4 percent these reductions are quite large, with three years of exposure reducing delinquency by 50 percent. In the final column, the effect of Georgia's financial education on being 90 plus days delinquent on an auto loan appears to be more muted, likely due to the rarity of severe auto loan delinquency. While the education is estimated to reduce delinquency two and three years post-implementation, the magnitude is little different from zero.
Panel B in Table 4 shows the same estimates for Idaho. While Idaho is quite different from Georgia demographically, and the education mandate had different features, the estimated effects on credit scores and delinquencies are similar. Young adults in Idaho exposed to the financial education only one year post-implementation appear to perform worse than those in the control, with the estimates suggesting a decline in credit score of 7.2 points. However, exposure two years after implementation is estimated to increase credit score by 2 points, and after three years the effect further increases to 6.6 points.
This delay in finding the expected effects suggests that Idaho's new financial education program may have taken more time to gain traction than that in Georgia. With regards to the estimates for any account being 30 days delinquent, we find little effect regardless of years post-implementation the young adults are exposed. However, the effect on having Finally, panel C of Table 4 shows the results for Texas. Here, we observe a very small 0.9 point negative effect of one year post-implementation exposure to the financial education on credit score, which switches to a 4.9 point increase in credit score for exposure two years after implementation, and a 13.0 point increase for exposure three years after im-
plementation. There appears to be no effect of the financial education on the rate of any account being 30 days delinquent in Texas; however, we find large and significant reductions in having any account 90 plus days delinquent in every year post-implementation.
Those young adults exposed to the Texas education one year post-implementation are 0.8 percentage points less likely to have any account 90 plus days delinquent, increasing in magnitude to 2.2 percentage points less likely after two years, and 3.3 percentage points less likely after three years. Based on the 15.9 percent average rate of having any account 90 plus days delinquent for the Texas sample shown in Table 5 , the 3.3 percentage points reduction from three years post-implementation exposure translates into 20.7 percent fewer severe delinquencies among Texas young adults.
As a robustness test of the synthetic controls identification strategy, Table 6 shows the same specifications as Table 4 , but using contiguous border states rather than a synthetic control state. The results here are generally consistent with the findings reported in Table 4 , although the magnitude of the effects increases substantially in some instances.
In Idaho, the credit score increase for young adults three years post-implementation is 16 points, while in Texas it reaches nearly 32 points. Similarly, the reduction in having any account 90 plus days delinquent with three years post-implementation exposure is now 1.9 percentage points in Idaho and 5.8 percentage points in Texas. While the magnitude of some of the estimates from the border states model appear somewhat large, the across the board consistency with our previous estimates lends credibility to the results from the synthetic controls specifications.
For consistency with the existing literature, we next use the year the mandated was passed as the first treatment year and compare them to those found when using year of implementation. We estimate the same equation as in Table 4 , and create a similar sample comparison, where we drop all individuals who graduated from high school (turned 18) three years after the mandate was passed. 14 As shown in Table 7 , using the mandate year yields somewhat similar results for Georgia and Texas, although the magnitudes are generally lower and less precisely estimated. Moreover, the results are less intuitive than those presented in Table 4 in that we don't observe linear improvement in outcomes with additional time post-mandate. For example, in Panel A, Georgia's financial education is estimated to yield a 6.7 point increase in credit score for exposure one year post-mandate, increase to 10 points after two years, and yield a 9.2 point increase after three years. In
Texas, the pattern of credit score increase is now 5.2 points after one year, 1.1 points after two years, and 3.7 points after three years. These coefficient magnitudes are substantially smaller than the effect we find in Table 4 . For Idaho, when using the mandate year the effect on credit score is now consistently negative, while almost none of the delinquency coefficients are statistically significant. Looking only at these alternative results using mandate year as the treatment could easily lead one to conclude that financial education has little positive effect on financial behavior. It's also worth emphasizing again that the states examined here have particularly rigorous mandates, so any aggregation of these states' education with less rigorous mandates would only further bias the results towards null effects. Table 8 then presents the results from the border state model when mandate year is used as the treatment rather than implementation year. In this specification, the results provide even less support for the effectiveness of financial education. The effect on credit score in each of the three states is trivial and often statistically insignificant. In Georgia and Idaho, the effects on the various delinquency outcomes are similarly trivial, while in
Texas the coefficients are small in magnitude and often suggest that financial education increases delinquency.
Overall, our findings are consistent with students exposed to the personal finance education (based on three years of implementation) had between a 7 point higher credit score (in Idaho) and a 29 point higher credit score (in Georgia). These translate into relative sizes (relative to standard deviations) of between 0.08σ units and 0.33σ units.
This appears to be driven by reductions in the incidence delinquencies among students exposed to the education, which supports the role of education in boosting financial capability and cash flow management.
Conclusion
The results of this study demonstrate that state financial education mandates in the three states examined yield positive effects on subsequent credit behaviors for the young adults exposed to these programs after implementation. Three years after implementation, we observe larger increases in credit scores and reductions in delinquency among the treated young adults. This is in stark contrast to the results from models where the year in which a mandate is initially enacted is used as the treatment, which show little effect of financial education on subsequent outcomes.
Our results contribute to literature in several ways. First, these results highlight the importance of financial literacy education researchers to focus on documenting and test-ing the actual implementation of programs in the classroom, rather than using the year of enactment. Second, we illustrate the utility of credit report data as a measure of financial behavior as an example of how 'downstream' financial behaviors can be measured to evaluate educational interventions given variation over geography and time. Third, we contribute to the education evaluation literature with an example of synthetic control methods, including a side-by-side comparison to geographic border approaches. Overall, we demonstrate that a these three standardized and relatively rigorous education programs do appear to alter credit behavior in early adulthood, and that the effects are increasing, consistent with schools refining and improving implementation. The estimated effect sizes are relatively large, ranging from one-tenth to one-third of a standard deviation. This is larger than found in prior studies of financial education (see Fernandes, Lynch and Netemeyer (2014) for a discussion) and relatively large in magnitude based on experiments in education more generally (see Hill et al. (2008) for a discussion).
These results add to the debate about state curriculum standards in education in by
providing a more precise estimate of the effects of the education mandate for personal financial content, but also raise important questions. Given that there is a finite amount of time in the school curriculum, an expansion of financial education courses invariably comes at the cost of less time devoted to other subjects. Thus, we cannot evaluate the overall effects of expanded financial education without knowing the specific trade-offs involved. We leave it to subsequent research to determine whether these positive effects persist further into adulthood, and to weigh the costs of providing financial education in school relative to its benefits. If the goal of policymakers is to influence debt repayment behavior, and the opportunity costs of providing this form of education are relatively low, then mandating financial education may prove to be a reasonable strategy. Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. P1 corresponds to the first graduating class affected by the requirement; P2 corresponds to the following graduating class; P3 is two classes after the first graduating class. Models include state-level and quarter by year fixed effects, unemployment rate in the state and year of graduation, and number of accounts. Samples are weighted by the synthetic control weights in Table 2 . Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. P1 corresponds to the first graduating class affected by the requirement; P2 corresponds to the following graduating class; P3 is two classes after the first graduating class. Models include state-level and quarter by year fixed effects, unemployment rate in the state and year of graduation, and number of accounts. Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. M1 corresponds to the mandate year, not the first graduating class that was affected; M2 is one year after the mandate, and M3 is two years after the mandate. Models include state-level and quarter by year fixed effects, unemployment rate in the state and year of graduation, and number of accounts. Samples are weighted by the synthetic control weights in Table 2 . Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. M1 corresponds to the mandate year, not the first graduating class that was affected; M2 is one year after the mandate, and M3 is two years after the mandate. Models include state-level and quarter by year fixed effects, unemployment rate in the state and year of graduation, and number of accounts.
